INTRODUCTION
Though written more than a century ago, Twain's account of the devastation wrought by that unnamed storm conveys a scene of utter ruin and hopelessness-a scene repeated all too frequently in the wake of major disasters. More recently, Hurricane Katrina, the costliest 2 and third deadliest 3 hurricane in American history, caused a SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:331 sense of stillness and quietude reminiscent of Twain's description of the storm-ravaged Gulf Coast. However, despite Katrina's devastation, disaster recovery itself need not be wholly disruptive to Gulf Coast communities. 4 Post-disaster redevelopment provides residents, policy makers, and community agents with the potential to "implement technologies and practices which afford a stronger and more sustainable future." 5 This Comment explains one method of facilitating the transition from the quiet of dissolution to the boom of effective, efficient, and equitable redevelopment. 6 Hurricane Katrina was "gargantuan in size," measuring 460 miles in diameter 7 and registering wind speeds up to 175 miles per hour. 8 The intensity of the storm surge forced the Mississippi River to temporarily flow backwards, 9 flooded 148 square miles of urban landscape, 10 and elevated the water level in one lake more than eleven feet in nine hours.
11
Katrina spread more than twenty-four million tons of debris over the Louisiana landscape, submerged 350,000 automobiles, and damaged more than 60,000 vessels. 12 To date, more than fifty-nine billion federal dollars have been committed to post-Katrina redevelopment. 13 Most troubling, the storm took the lives of approximately 1500 individuals. 5 Id. 6 While this Comment focuses on Hurricane Katrina's effect on the Gulf Coast, the material facts and statutory framework is relevant to any post-disaster redevelopment process. 7 See, e.g., LRA, JUNE-AUG. QUARTERLY REPORT 2 (referring to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita as "taking nearly 1,500 lives"); FEMA, BUILDING PERFORMANCE, supra note 3, at 1-5 (citing death toll of approximately 1,300).
One of the neighborhoods most devastated by Katrina was the Lower Ninth Ward. 15 This neighborhood of 14,000 residents 16 sits, in some places, four feet below sea level and was flooded by eighteen feet of water when the levees failed. 17 The levee breach produced "truly catastrophic results," 18 and sent forth a wall of water that demolished homes in its immediate vicinity, caused extensive flooding in others, and ultimately took the lives of hundreds in less than two hours. 19 While approximately ninety-eight percent of Lower Ninth residents were African American, 20 Katrina's destructive capacity did not discriminate. "In the [Orleans, Jefferson, and St. Bernard Parishes], people of color represented 52% of the pre-Katrina population and 53% of the dead . . . . [T] he storm flooded 51% of the whiteoccupied homes and 67% of the black-occupied homes in the threeparish area . . . ." 21 While the storm destroyed without regard to race and wealth, the burden of redevelopment will fall particularly hard on the poor, which include most Lower Ninth residents. 22 The lasting effects of Katrina are fundamentally different than the more transient consequences that follow minor flooding or wind damage. Researchers analogized Katrina's effects to the nuclear disaster at Chernobyl 23 and called for "pioneering thinking" in restoring the Gulf Coast. 24 Without such pioneering thinking-or, at a minimum, strong and sustained leadership-redevelopment is bound to stumble along in an inefficient and inequitable manner. For example, in the absence of a program that encouraged efficient redevelopment, the city was plagued by "jack-o-lantern neighborhoods," where "residents are scattered among abandoned houses" throughout the city limits. 25 This population pattern creates a severe strain on public services and infrastructure at a time when city services, as a 15 In response to the devastation, local, 27 state, 28 and federal 29 officials attempted to deliver some sense of normalcy to the hurricane's victims by proposing or implementing various policies. One product of these efforts is the Road Home, a program designed and implemented by state lawmakers, but funded and approved by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. 30 The Road Home provides qualified Louisiana residents with grants of up to $150,000 for uncompensated storm-related damage to their homes. 31 The plan provides grants for home renovation and also permits qualified homeowners to sell property to the state at a pre-disaster fair market value. This lack of funding for critical infrastructure development will likely place greater pressure on city planners to reduce the city's footprint, i.e., concentrate redevelopment in limited areas, thereby maximizing the impact of reduced infrastructure redevelopment. This, in turn, may place greater pressure on the city to implement the buyout-only provision of the Road Home program. The criteria for this funding restriction are left unarticulated. A major concern is that this funding shortage will increase the pressure on Road Home administrators to cast a wider net on the areas in which homeowners will not have the opportunity to benefit from Road Home renovation funding. 
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The Road Home offers maximum financial assistance to homeowners who choose to rebuild or relocate within Louisiana. 35 If homeowners resided in a Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)-designated floodplain before the storm made landfall but did not carry insurance, 36 or if they elect to move outside of the state rather than rebuild in their communities, 37 they may receive Road Home assistance, but not the full $150,000 grant.
38
The basic contours of the Road Home are largely commendable. It provides much-needed support to protect the homeowner status of Katrina-displacees and at the same time provides program administrators the flexibility to concentrate redevelopment in order to maximize the impact of a scarce resource-federal financial support. Yet the program remains fundamentally flawed. It unnecessarily creates a cloud of confusion around the benefits and restrictions relevant to Louisiana's most vulnerable homeowners.
A critical provision buried within the administrative innards of the Road Home holds that residents living in areas "where a high proportion of homeowners are choosing not to invest" in their homes may not be eligible for the $150,000 rehabilitation grants. 39 Rather, such homeowners may sell their homes to the state at a pre-flood fair market value, sell on the open market, or finance the renovations themselves.
40
Compounding the problem, program administrators never articulated the standards to be used in identifying which neighborhoods, if any, would be subject to the funding restriction. 41 35 LRA, ROAD HOME OVERVIEW, supra note 32, at 6. 36 Id. at 12. "[A] 30% penalty applies to those who failed to purchase insurance for their homes. A penalty applies to those without flood insurance in a designated flood plain and those without hazard insurance that were outside the flood plain." Id. 37 Id. at 9. If a homeowner chooses to sell her home to the state, the homeowner will receive sixty percent of the property's pre-storm fair market value. 40 Id. at 7. 41 Id. To date, program administrators have not expressly implemented the provision. However, regardless of whether the buyout restriction is ultimately implemented, the provision's pernicious effects were felt in the months immediately following the storm, when residents made relocation decisions. Without clearly articulated standards, the ambiguity of who would receive benefits-aside from how much a resident would receive-would have invariably deterred residents who lacked the financial ability to self-finance a major home renovation (precisely the homeowners who would benefit most from government assistance The Road Home's buyout-only restriction is, in the abstract, a reasonable and legitimate provision in light of the fact that the population of New Orleans dwindled to 190,000 one year after the storm, 42 less than half of its pre-storm population of 455,000.
43 Notwithstanding the reasonableness of the provision in the abstract, the practical effect of the restriction works an inequitable harm on displaced residents targeted by the program's efforts to constrict the city's size, or its "footprint." While the initial and perhaps most critical postKatrina redevelopment planning has passed, this issue must be confronted as natural disasters will inevitably affect communities across America, 44 and redevelopment plans will invariably follow. Plans similar to the Road Home may be common in the future, as it combines flexibility and discretion at the administrative level with a concern for the homeowner status of displacees at the beneficiary level. 45 This Comment asserts that Katrina-displaced homeowners are eligible for benefits beyond the buyout-only provisions of the Road Home under the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies for Federal and Federally Assisted Programs (URA). 46 As noted above, the buyout-only provision limits a homeowner's options to self-financed renovation, open market sale, or a state buyout at a pre-storm fair market value. 47 The first two options 
I. GULF COAST SUSCEPTIBILITY TO NATURAL DISASTERS
Much has been made of the sheer strength and size of Katrina. However, by the time it made landfall in Louisiana, it was a relatively pedestrian meteorological event.
48
The more profound and lasting issue is the Gulf Coast's vulnerability to even medium-sized hurricanes, caused by a confluence of disappearing wetlands, subsiding land, and an inadequate levee system. This convergence of factors led some scientists to characterize the Louisiana coastal region as "the very definition of an inherently vulnerable landscape." 49 The Louisiana coastline is distinguished by its vast network of swamps and marshes, which account for a large portion of America's 48 VAN In the past, the wetlands provided a crucial buffer between Louisiana coastal communities and Gulf storm systems. 51 However, in the last several decades, these protective wetlands disappeared at an alarming rate.
52
In addition to the disappearing wetlands, a recent study indicates that New Orleans and its levees are sinking into the Mississippi River, with a period of drastic subsidence between the years 2002 and 2005. 53 Currently, most of New Orleans is about five feet below sea level, 54 and the city is subsiding at a rate of one inch per year. 55 This rate of subsidence may seem trivial, but some levees are now three feet lower than originally planned, substantially reducing the protection they were intended to provide. 56 Explaining the protections ostensibly provided by the levees, one oil company executive noted that "[i]n the offshore [oil] business . . . , we design major structures in the Gulf for a 100-year wave height. Because that height is an estimate, engineers add a safety factor of four to six for manned structures-that is, they build the structure to withstand a wave that is four to six times as high as the theoretical maximum." . . 52 BRINKLEY, supra note 7, at 9. One journalist recounted the variety of comparative measurements used to convey the rate at which land is being lost on the Louisiana coastline: "The region . . . is losing land at the rate of a football field every thirty eight minutes. Alternatively, it is said, the area is shrinking by a large desktop's worth of ground every second, or a tennis court's worth every thirteen seconds, or twenty-five square miles a year." Kolbert, supra note 11, at 48. One estimate indicates that an additional seven hundred square miles of coastal marshland will be lost by 2050." BRINKLEY, supra note 7, at 9. 53 structed, 100 miles of marshes served as an effective buffer between residential zones and Gulf storm systems.
58
In addition to the post-Katrina exodus of more than half the city's residents, 59 New Orleans was suffering from a decades-long population decline.
60
The city's footprint was more appropriate for its pre-1960s population of more than 600,000.
61 Population decline is relevant to post-disaster recovery efforts because it is difficult, if not fiscally implausible, for a "city shorn of much of its tax base" 62 to continue to provide effective and efficient public services to residents on a pre-storm population pattern.
63
The dramatic pace of coastal erosion and land subsidence indicate that the Louisiana coastal region will continue to be susceptible to the devastating effects of even medium-sized hurricanes. This need not deter redevelopment, but it should be kept in mind as policy makers at the city, state, and federal levels respond to Katrina's lasting effects and plan to mitigate the damage sustained in future storm systems.
II. URA DISPLACEMENT BENEFITS
The express purpose of the URA is to establish "a uniform policy for the fair and equitable treatment of persons displaced" by programs funded with federal dollars, so that displaced persons do not "suffer disproportionate injuries as a result of programs designed for the benefit of the public as a whole." 65 The objective of the URA is to ensure "fair, uniform, and equitable treatment" of any person displaced as a direct result of a federally assisted land acquisition. 66 Furthermore, the URA calls for consideration of "the unique circumstances" of displaced persons so that "persons in essentially similar 58 Id. 59 Varney, supra note 42. Nearly two years after the storm, some estimated the New Orleans population was sixty-two percent of its pre-Katrina level. The URA attempts to ensure that property owners whose homes are acquired by a qualified state agency "receive the replacement value-rather than the market value-of their property." 68 The URA regulations provide for three tranches of benefits. Benefits enumerated in Subpart B are triggered if property is conveyed involuntarily. 69 Subpart B benefits include, inter alia, a homeowner's right to an expeditious acquisition of his property, 70 advance notice of an agency's intent to acquire property, 71 offers of "just compensation," 72 and certain litigation expenses. 73 The benefits enumerated in Subparts D and E are triggered if the property owner is considered a "displaced person." 74 Subpart E provides that an owneroccupant displaced by a qualified state agency 75 may receive a payment of up to $22,500 to acquire replacement housing.
76
The replacement housing must be "a decent, safe, and sanitary dwelling . . . reasonably accessible to public services and places of employment," 77 functionally equivalent to the acquired property, 78 adequate in size to accommodate the occupants, 79 in an area that is "not subject to unreasonable environmental conditions," 80 86 and litigation expenses if the government unsuccessfully attempts to acquire a particular piece of property through condemnation proceedings. 87 While the URA provides significant financial assistance to displaced homeowners, 88 it also preserves a modicum of flexibility for city planners. For example, the comparable replacement dwelling is not required to be in the same neighborhood as the acquired property, 89 and the replacement dwelling need not contain "every feature of the displacement dwelling." 90 As noted above, Subparts D and E are triggered if a property owner is considered to be a "displaced person." The statutory and regulatory definitions of "displaced person" have proven to be fluid concepts. As originally envisioned in 1971, a displaced person was 81 Id. § 24.2(a)(6)(viii). Replacement housing is "considered to be within the homeowner's financial means if the homeowner will receive the full price differential . . . , all increased mortgage interest costs . . . and all incidental expenses . . . ." Id. . Evidence suggests super-compensation, i.e., compensation above the statutory maximum, is not unheard of, and may be used both to ensure replacement housing as well as to overcome popular disapproval of takings projects. Garnett, supra note 68, at 122-23. 83 42 U.S.C. § 4622(a)(1). 84 Id. Also, businesses are entitled to reestablishment compensation. § 4622(c). Renters also receive significant protection under the URA, and may receive, among other things, up to sixty times the amount of the difference between their predisplacement and post-displacement rental costs. In passing the Uniform Relocation Act Amendments of 1987 ("1987 Amendments"), Congress refined the conceptual framework of a displaced person to include a "direct result" element. 92 Consequently, only those residents displaced from their property as a "direct result . . . of the acquisition of such property" by a federally funded program would be considered statutorily protected displaced persons.
93
The 1987 Amendments also incorporated a provision to further clarify the scope and application of the URA by noting who was not a displaced person.
94
These negative definitions expressly preclude a resident who unlawfully occupies a home from enjoying URA displacement benefits.
95
Additionally, individuals who reside on the property for the purpose of obtaining URA benefits, 96 as well as shortterm renters whose period of tenancy expires before the property is needed by the acquiring agency, are similarly precluded from enjoying URA benefits as they are "persons not displaced."
97
Following the change in statutory language, the Federal Highway Administration (FHA) revised the URA regulatory framework in 1989. 98 These regulations expounded upon the displaced person standard and incorporated the direct result element for the acquisition, 99 rehabilitation, or demolition of real property. 100 Additionally, a non-exclusive listing of persons not displaced was included. These regulations were consistent with the statutory changes made by the 1987 Amendments.
102
The revised regulations preclude mandatory benefits under Subpart B if an "owner-occupant . . . voluntarily conveys his or her property, as described in § 24.101(a)(1) and (2)." 103 Section 24.101(a)(1) describes a voluntary conveyance as one in which "no specific site or property needs to be acquired," 104 the property in question "is not part of an intended, planned, or designated project area,"
105 and it will not be acquired if the owner-occupant and the acquiring agency fail to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement. 106 The acquiring agency must also relate to the owner "what it believes to be the fair market value of the property."
107 For a transaction to be considered "voluntary," each of the four criteria must be satisfied.
108
In addition, section 24.101(a)(2) provides that displacement benefits are not to be extended if the acquiring agency is not vested with the authority to exercise eminent domain.
109
This facially unequivocal language could be interpreted to preclude a cause of action for displacement benefits for Katrina-displacees because the Road Home is not vested with the power of eminent domain.
Before proceeding, it is important to reinforce the fact that the voluntariness of a certain transaction governs Subpart B benefits only.
110
Benefits under Subparts D and E are triggered only if the homeowner is a "displaced person" under the URA. 111 There is, without doubt, a large degree of overlap between the triggering events; but the standards are nevertheless different. Katrina displacees should be considered "displaced persons" if they moved as a "direct 102 Compare § 24.2(g)(2) with Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies for Federal and Federally Assisted Programs, 42 U.S.C. § 4601(6)(A) (1988) . 103 § 24.2(g)(2)(viii). 104 Id. § 24.101(a)(1)(i). 105 Id. § 24.101(a)(1)(ii). 106 Id. § 24.101(a)(1)(iii). 107 Id. § 24.101(a)(1)(iv). 108 Id. § 24.101(a)(1). 109 49 C.F.R. § 24.101(a)(2) (1989). Subpart B benefits will not be extended under this provision so long as the acquiring agency "clearly advise[s] the owner that it is unable to acquire the property" through eminent domain proceedings should the parties fail to come to an agreement. Id. § 24.101(a)(2)(i). Additionally, the owner must be informed as to what the acquiring agency believes is the "fair market value of the property." Id. § 24.101(a)(2)(ii 114 and once their property is formally acquired by the program, the displaced homeowners will be eligible for benefits under Subparts D and E.
Three arguments can be made to rebut the apparent prerequisite for eminent domain power to trigger Subpart B benefits. First, section 24.101, while facially unequivocal, is in reality more nuanced and reflects the underlying regulatory and legislative framework within which displacement arises. 115 Second, section 24.101 is without the weight of law because it impermissibly narrows the scope and application of the URA. Third, the buyout-only provision amounts to an involuntary conveyance of property under the URA, thereby satisfying even the narrowest interpretation of the scope of section 24.101 under a theory of "functional takings."
III. THEORIES OF RECOVERY UNDER THE URA

A. The Regulations are More Nuanced Than Their Facially Unequivocal Language
That the Road Home is not vested with the power of eminent domain does not preclude Katrina-displacees from successfully pursuing Subpart B benefits, despite the ostensibly unambiguous language of section 24.101. As noted above, section 24.101(a)(2) expressly precludes URA benefits if the acquiring agency does not have the power of eminent domain. 116 However, in explicating the scope of section 24.101, the FHA noted that "[e]minent domain authority is not a determining factor by itself." 117 Moreover, the 1987 Amendments were described as expanding the scope of the URA "to include any private entity that has the power of eminent domain under Fed- 
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COMMENT Moreover, the URA's preference for substance over form(and the emphasis on involuntariness, rather than the presence or absence of eminent domain authority) was recognized by the FHA itself when it noted that "[t]he essence of a voluntary transaction is the conditions surrounding the transaction, not the type of transaction itself."
122
Considering the statutory and administrative intent, it is apparent that the regulations are more nuanced than they initially appear. Understood in its proper context, the reference to eminent domain power is nothing more than a useful short-hand approach-but ultimately not a dispositive element-in assessing whether an acquiring agency must provide Subpart B benefits.
The FHA revised the URA regulations in 2005, and it is only with the proper understanding of the 1987 Amendments and their corresponding regulations that the more recent regulations can be placed in appropriate context and accorded the correct interpretation. Notably, the 2005 revisions amended the regulatory framework in the absence of any change to the relevant statutory language of the URA.
123
The definition of displaced person, redesignated in 2005 as section 24.2(a)(9), remained substantively equivalent to its 1989 counterpart. 124 The definition of persons not displaced is also left largely, displacees are not precluded from receiving URA displacement benefits simply because the Road Home is not vested with the power of eminent domain.
B. A Narrowly Construed Eminent Domain Provision Manifestly Contradicts the Unambiguous Intent of the URA
If the reference to eminent domain is interpreted narrowlythat is, if it is interpreted to require the presence of the eminent domain power to trigger Subpart B benefits-it would impermissibly narrow the scope and application of the URA and would consequently be without the weight of law. Assuming a reviewing court determines that Congress did not clearly express its intent to apply the voluntariness test, the FHA's regulations would be examined for reasonableness. 133 Congress expressly authorized the FHA to promulgate regulations to administer the URA.
134
These regulations are entitled to "controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary" to the statute. 135 Regulations do not carry the force of law if they are irreconcilable with the "clear meaning of the statute, as revealed by its language, purpose, and history."
136 While "considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer," 137 deference to an agency's policy expertise does not merit granting carte blanche authority to promulgate regulations that contradict congressional intent.
Under Chevron, courts first ask whether there is clear congressional intent respecting the issue at hand, and if not, whether the agency's interpretation of the underlying statute is reasonable. 138 As discussed below, the statutory scheme and legislative history of the URA clearly and unequivocally expresses congressional intent to avoid any mechanistic, dispositive eminent domain requirement. SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:331
The 1987 Amendments significantly expounded upon the express declaration of policy accompanying the URA. 139 As amended, the statute calls for "fair, uniform, and equitable treatment of all affected persons," 140 and reaffirms a specific commitment to improving the "housing conditions of economically disadvantaged persons." 141 In explaining the language behind the amended language, Senator David Durenberger, a co-sponsor of the 1987 Amendments, explained that the declaration of policy establishes that a URA triggering event can arise outside of traditional property acquisitions. 142 Moreover, it was intended that "uniformity should be subordinate to the need for flexibility in administering the URA." 143 In addition to promoting principles of administrative flexibility, the 1987 Amendments were designed to "broaden the applicability of the act to include persons not . . . eligible for assistance" under the 1971 provisions. 144 The Federal Register is replete with statements by the FHA recognizing the URA's mandate for flexibility over uniformity, and fact-intensive inquiries into voluntariness rather than a cursory eminent domain litmus test.
145
The enumeration of federal and state agencies required to comply with the URA ("covered entities") was also amended in 1987. Specifically, the 1987 Amendments amended the definition of covered entities to include those vested with the power of eminent domain.
146
The fact that the eminent domain provision was added to the list of covered entities is significant. Proposed versions of the amended language-which were never passed by Congress-called for replacing the description of covered entities with a simple, but markedly less flexible, definition of a covered entity to include only those entities
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147
In adopting the more flexible language, Congress rejected the notion that URA benefits could be triggered only by an entity vested with the power of eminent domain. Moreover, in a report on the proposed amendments, the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs explained that "acquisition of property under eminent domain, or the threat thereof, is not the only cause of the permanent and involuntary displacement of a person."
148
If the eminent domain provision in the 1989 regulations is interpreted narrowly-as dispositive rather than merely probativethen the statutory framework and legislative history outlined above demonstrates that the narrowed interpretation manifestly contradicts clear and unambiguous congressional intent and should not be accorded the weight of law.
149
Despite unambiguous statutory language, 150 and contrary to legislative intent, 151 the regulatory eminent domain provision improperly exalts uniformity over Congress's express desire for administrative flexibility. As described above, the 1987 Amendments were intended to broaden the class of people protected by the URA, and it was expressly noted that displacement benefits could be triggered absent the exercise of the eminent domain power.
152
If interpreted narrowly, however, the regulations promulgated in 1989 would significantly curtail URA benefits so as to apply only to the exceptional class of displaced residents who are forced to relocate because of traditional eminent domain takings. Consequently, the putative regulatory requirement of eminent domain authority to trigger Subpart B benefits should not be accorded the weight of law since the regulations manifestly contradict the statutory framework and legislative intent informing the URA. 
C. Assuming a Narrow Construction of the Eminent Domain Provision, the Buyout-Only Provision is a URA Triggering Event Under a Theory of Functional Takings
Under a narrow interpretation of the eminent domain provision, and assuming the regulations are accorded the weight of law, the Road Home buyout-only provision nevertheless triggers URA displacement benefits. The buyout-only provision amounts to a "functional taking" of property under the URA. There are two hurdles that a viable cause of action under the URA must clear on its way to judicial recognition under this approach: the policy of constructive occupancy, and the theory of "functional takings." The URA mandates that a displaced person occupy the acquired residence for 180 days prior to acquisition to be eligible for relocation benefits. Furthermore, functional takings for purposes of the URA is substantively different than a constructive taking in the eminent domain context, although similar arguments can be made for both doctrines. Constructive takings arise when a condemning authority engages in a course of unconstitutional conduct intended to force homeowners to sell property to the government at depressed values. See, e.g., Amen v. City of Dearborn, 718 F.2d 789, 794-96 (6th Cir. 1983) (finding that city government engaged in conduct amounting to a constructive taking of property when the city, inter alia, manipulated permits to limit homeowner renovations, indicated compensation would be reduced the longer homeowners waited to sell their property, and repeatedly informed the residents that their property was subject to condemnation). A functional taking for purposes of the URA need not meet the more rigid requirements of eminent domain takings; rather, it must only be evident that the conveyance was not voluntary. See supra Part II.
154 42 U.S.C. § 4623(a)(1).
agency acquires a property upon which the individual was constructing a second home with the intention that it would ultimately be his primary residence.
155
Alternatively, URA benefits would not be triggered if an individual's completed second home is involuntarily conveyed to an acquiring agency if the acquired home is not intended to be a primary residence.
156
The plain language of the 180-day requirement might appear to preclude the recovery of URA benefits by Katrina displacees. The argument would likely be made that (1) Road Home displacement benefits are unwarranted in cases where property owners did not occupy their homes for the required 180-day period prior to acquisition, and (2) even if the 180-day requirement is satisfied or overlooked, it was a natural disaster, not a federally financed acquisition, that forced residents out of their homes. Neither contention holds water.
State and federal acquiring agencies argued the validity of the constructive occupancy policy before a number of courts, 157 despite the fact that it is not codified in any provision of the URA or its regulations.
158
The doctrine was first recognized in Seeherman v. Lynn, a case in which residents of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania were displaced by Hurricane Agnes and whose properties were subsequently acquired by a federally funded redevelopment authority.
159
In Seeherman, the court found that the theory of constructive occupancy "provided that all owners of property . . . who occupied their homes on the day prior to [a natural disaster] would be eligible to receive relocation assistance." 1977) (by implication). The court in Ledesma also found it relevant that the homeowners in question, who were deemed to have a case strong enough to survive the defendant's motion for summary judgment, were forced to live in a second home because of economic hardship. Id. at 565. Consequently, the court found that under the policy of constructive occupancy, the homeowners were not precluded from receiving displacement benefits under the URA even though they were not residing in the acquired home at the time of acquisition. withheld if an otherwise eligible homeowner is denied benefits because she was prevented from reestablishing occupancy due to a presidentially declared disaster. 161 The court offered this perspective despite the fact that the provision in question applied only to the URA's predecessor, not to the URA itself. 162 Two years after Seeherman, a district court in Ledesma v. Urban Renewal Agency offered a more persuasive analysis of the origin of the constructive occupancy policy. 163 The court presumed that the policy originated with the URA's requirement that residents displaced by a federally funded program receive fair and equitable treatment. 164 The court relied on information in the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) Relocation Handbook, which articulated the constructive occupancy policy as a means of mitigating what might otherwise be inequitable results from the strict application of the URA's statutory and regulatory provisions. 165 
Actual Displacement Through Functional Takings
The second and admittedly more complicated hurdle to judicial recognition of a URA-based cause of action is the theory of "functional takings." As explained above, Road Home rehabilitation funding is not available to residents residing "in an area where a high proportion of homeowners are choosing not to invest" in their homes. 166 City officials publicly claimed that no communities would be targeted for planned elimination; however, the choice may yet be forced on them as funding shortages continue to plague redevelopment efforts. 167 Moreover, the provision's pernicious effects were felt in the months immediately following the storm, and will have the same effect on economically disadvantaged homeowners regardless of whether the buyout-only restriction is actually implemented.
168
The "functional takings" theory is based on the principle that "[a]cceptance of decision-making power requires acceptance of the 161 Id. at 1322 n.5 (citing Disaster Relief Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 4484 (1970)). 162 Id. 163 Ledesma v. Urban Renewal Agency, 432 F. Supp. 564, 567 (S.D. Tex. 1977). 164 Id. 165 Id. at 567 n.1. 166 LRA, ACTION PLAN AMENDMENT, supra note 39, at 6-7. 167 Nossiter, supra note 59, at 1 (describing funding shortages in the Road Home as well as a complete absence of funding for the city's own billion-dollar redevelopment plan). 168 See supra note 41.
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COMMENT 353 responsibility for the predictable effects of that power." 169 The displacement of New Orleans residents is both a planned and predictable effect of the Road Home buyout-only provision. 170 The program provides homeowners with a means of selling property to the state so the property owner can move out of a neighborhood or the state entirely. Additionally, the ambiguities surrounding the administration of the Road Home serve to reinforce displacement. 171 A Rand Corporation 172 study, conducted in response to Gulf Coast redevelopment, explained that
[i]ndividual and collective decisions about how to proceed with reconstruction in the affected areas of the Gulf Coast are interconnected in complex ways, sometimes referred to in shorthand as the "chicken and egg" problem. Uncertainty about the future level of protection will temper or tip investments and the rebuild/relocate decisions that ultimately shape the scope of reconstruction. 173 Thus, the uncertainty about the potential benefits extended to returning homeowners in the months following Katrina created a disincentive to return and invest financial resources and sweat equity in rebuilding storm-damaged homes. SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:331 ers were choosing to reinvest and its cripplingly slow delivery of federal funding. Areas in which "too few homeowners are choosing" to reinvest will likely be the areas where residents have the least disposable income to devote to post-storm rehabilitation and were least able to afford homeowners insurance prior to the flooding.
176
In a 1979 report, HUD recognized that the effects of displacement are particularly disruptive to families with lower incomes. 177 Thus, it is necessary to consider the socioeconomic status of the displaced residents. 178 Based on data from the U.S. Census Bureau, the residents of the Lower Ninth Ward can undoubtedly be characterized as a "socially vulnerable population." 179 Nearly ninety percent of the population is African American and more than one-third of the residents do not have a high school degree. 180 The median household income in 1999 was less than half of the national average, 181 median family income was sixty percent lower than the national average, 182 and nearly four times as many families lived in poverty than in the nation as a whole. 183 However, despite the dismal economic statistics, a high percentage of Ninth Ward residents are homeowners compared to the national average. 184 Acknowledging that residents of the Ninth Ward are generally not as wealthy as their state and national counterparts is not meant to suggest that any federal program that creates incentives for a state buyout of property triggers the URA if the sellers are of limited financial means. Rather, this is meant to reinforce the express purpose of the URA to consider the unique circumstances of those affected by federally financed redevelopment efforts. 185 The theory of "functional takings" is consistent with the purpose of the URA. It recognizes the reality of the Road Home buyout-only provision-specifically, that a state buyout is the only rational option for displaced homeowners of limited financial means. This category of property transfers to the Road Home cannot be characterized as a voluntary conveyance falling outside the protection of the URA. 186 As explained above, homeowners will have the opportunity to self-finance the renovation of their homes. 187 Considering the low median income, high percentage of homeowners who own their homes, and the complete and utter devastation of the homes in the Ninth Ward, this "alternative" will likely be entirely unrealistic for a substantial portion of Ninth Ward residents. SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:331 submerged everything else in fourteen feet of water. 190 As a result of this complete devastation, this subset of homeowners will likely receive nothing more than the value of the land on which their homes were formerly located if they were to sell on the open market. As with the self-financing option, the open-market sale "alternative" hardly presents homeowners with even the semblance of choice. This distressing reality leads to one ineluctable outcome for affected homeowners: sell to the state at a pre-storm fair market value. Consequently, certain Road Home acquisitions should properly be considered "functional takings" for purposes of the URA, thereby moving the property conveyance away from the realm of voluntariness and triggering URA displacement benefits.
CONCLUSION
Some may argue that compelling URA benefits punishes the Road Home for its generosity as the program essentially gives qualified residents free retroactive flood insurance. This argument carries at least superficial appeal. However, a court must examine the practical effect, logical coherence, and statutory framework governing post-disaster redevelopment. 191 First, if Road Home administrators ultimately categorize certain neighborhoods as buyout-only, it will be an express attempt to further the broader public weal to the detriment of those homeowners who would otherwise benefit from the redevelopment program. Second, widespread displacement was aggravated by the ambiguities created by Road Home administrators. Specifically, program administrators (1) failed to determine which neighborhoods, if any, would be affected by the buyout-only restriction, (2) failed to articulate guidelines quickly and clearly so residents could choose to rebuild or relocate, and (3) failed to promptly distribute grant monies to qualified homeowners.
There is a natural predilection to rebuild what once was, yet difficult and politically unpalatable choices must be made if the realities facing the Gulf Coast are to be honestly and compassionately confronted. 192 KAHAN ET AL., supra note 23, at xiii.
viduals, reason for optimism remains. Residents, community groups, and policy makers have a uniquely powerful and dynamic chargerebuild a great city. In so doing, three principles must guide the effort: effectiveness, efficiency, and equity. Effective redevelopment hinges on whether city, state, and federal officials forthrightly confront the confluence of disappearing wetlands, land subsidence, and an inadequate levee system. Efficient redevelopment relies on vesting city planners and policy makers with both the discretion and the leadership to concentrate redevelopment in order to facilitate the provision of critical infrastructure and city services. A smaller city, at least in the short term, may be a necessary evil brought about by the reality of permanent and semi-permanent displacement, which in turn places severe constraints on city services.
Equally important is that redevelopment efforts be guided by principles of equity and comply with the uniform federal displacement policy. After Katrina, a smaller New Orleans serves the public welfare, a reality acknowledged in the Road Home's buyout-only provision, and the affected residents should not be forced to "suffer disproportionate injuries as a result" of the planned redevelopment. 193 Moreover, the "choices" the Road Home provides certain homeowners ultimately leads to a single inescapable outcome, thereby removing the critical element of voluntariness from buyout-only acquisitions. Implementing the status-preserving principles embodied in the URA can potentially transform the Road Home from the single largest housing recovery program to one that is also effective, efficient, and equitable.
In the end, however, the scope of this Comment is broader than either Hurricane Katrina or the Road Home. Both are offered and analyzed here as templates of future disasters and corresponding recovery efforts. It is crucial that government officials, community groups, practitioners, and the general public understand the scope and application of the URA. The element of voluntariness embedded within the URA's statutory and regulatory framework can redefine future post-disaster redevelopment efforts, and provide government officials the flexibility to offer unique and resource-efficient recovery plans while simultaneously protecting the homeowner status of displaced residents.
